INTRODUCTION
. The law makes clear that there are two bases on which to justify the imposition of the death penalty: retribution and deterrence. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) . Retribution demands that the severity of punishment be dependent on the offender's culpability but that retribution and deterrence were not served by executing the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002) .
We will discuss both elements later in this paper. It is assumed that "children have a very special place in life which law should reflect". May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) does it not necessarily follow that "civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of execution of children?" Model Penal Code, § 210.6, Official Draft and Revised Comments, commentary at 133, (1980) .
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS AND BACKGROUND
The first execution of a juvenile offender was in 1642 with Thomas Graunger in Massachusetts Bay Colony when he was tried and found guilty, at the age of 16 or 17, of buggery "with a mare, a cow, two goats, divers sheep, two calves and a turkey." R. Hale A juvenile justice system separate from the adult criminal justice system was established in the United States in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899. The goal, envisioned by Jane Addams, was to divert young offenders from the destructive punishments of the criminal courts and encourage rehabilitation based on the individuals needs. Victor L. Strieb, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 -December 31, 2001 . This effort recognized that children are different than adults in terms of cognitive development, impulse and emotional control, and judgment capability. The first juvenile court led to a system that held juveniles accountable for delinquent behavior while providing developmentally appropriate rehabilitation and deterrence programs.
In 1999, at the age of 11, Michigan's Nathaniel Abraham was charged with murder. He became the youngest child in American history to be prosecuted as an adult. The movement toward trying juvenile cases in adult criminal courts has occurred despite the number of juvenile arrests declining in every violent crime category from 1993 to 1999. During this period, the juvenile population grew 8%. John A. Tuell • Almost half of those sentenced had troubled family histories and social backgrounds as well as problems such as physical abuse, unstable childhood environments, and illiteracy.
• Twenty-nine suffered psychological disturbances (e.g. profound depression, paranoia, self-mutilation)
• Just under one-third exhibited mental disability evidenced by low or borderline I.Q. scores.
• More than half were indigent
• Eighteen were involved in intensive substance abuse before the crime. Juveniles sentenced to death share varying combinations of these mitigating circumstances, in addition to their youthful age. In 61 of the 91 cases (67 percent), one or more factors in addition to "youth" was present. Robinson (1989) . While terminology used to describe those individuals with sub-average intellectual functioning has evolved from "mentally retarded" to a more progressive categorization of either "mentally disabled" or "intellectually disabled", the term mentally retarded will be used for consistency, since that was the language used by the Supreme Court. The Petitioners in Roper relied on the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Under the "evolving standards of decency" test, the Supreme Court held that it was therefore cruel and unusual punishment to execute a person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the murder.
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy cited research that found that juveniles have a lack of maturity and sense of responsibility when compared to that of adults. He went on to note that from 1990 until the Roper case was heard, "only seven countries other than the United States had executed juvenile offenders…..Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and China". He went further in stating that each of these countries had either abolished the death penalty for juveniles or made a public disavowal of the practice, with the exception of the United States. Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
In writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the appropriate question should be whether the execution of such defendants was considered cruel and unusual punishment at the point at which the Bill of Rights was ratified. Further, he objected to the Court's willingness to take guidance from foreign law in interpreting the Constitution. Id. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority stands to move the debate to an even higher level of attention and importance. By citing foreign sources of law as further support for the Court's own views of what punishments violate the Eighth Amendment, the Roper Court showed what may be at stake in the outcome of this debate between the liberal justices and the conservatives, led by Justice Scalia. The depth of the support for citing foreign sources of law suggests that the movement to do this is just beginning and will only gather force over time. In the wake of Roper the debate on the Court is no longer over whether to cite foreign sources of law but over when and how to cite them. This portends a sea change in the Court's doctrine. 86, 78 (1958), described the importance "of referring to the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be 'cruel and unusual.'" Roper, at 560-61. While not excusing the crimes committed by juveniles, the Court focused on the important differences between youths and adults; namely, the diminished culpability of youth as a class and children's innate capacity for change. Roper, at 568-76. Juveniles' diminished culpability rests on their lesser developmental capabilities, increased susceptibility to negative influences, and inability to control their surroundings. The Court concluded that those characteristics make youth less deserving of the harshest forms of punishment. Roper, at 569-70.
Kennedy noted: the scientific and sociological studies ….tend to confirm, "a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions." Roper, at 569. It has been noted that "adolescents are overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior." Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 Developmental Review 339 (1992). Juveniles are also more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure….This is explained in part by the prevailing circumstances that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment. Steinberg This is not to deny that international opinion mattered in Roper. It did. But the reason it mattered had everything to do with politics, and nothing to do with the law. With forty-eight nations, a slew of former diplomats and over a dozen Nobel Peace Prize Laureates telling the Court how damaging the juvenile death penalty was to foreign relations, international opinion was going to color the Justices' thinking (especially after In concluding that the death penalty for minors is cruel and unusual punishment, the Court cited a "national consensus" against the practice, along with medical and social-science evidence that teenagers are too immature to be held accountable for their crimes to the same extent as adults. No recent data provide reason to reconsider Roper's holding that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment. Moreover, defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of such punishments than are murderers. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Serious non-homicide crimes "may be devastating in their harm….but 'in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,' ….they cannot be compared to murder in their 'severity and irrevocability.'" Id.
ONE STEP FURTHER -LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
As for the punishment, life without parole is "the second most severe penalty permitted by law," 2 and is especially harsh for a juvenile offender, who will on average serve more years The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits punishment that is cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court has interpreted this prohibition to mean that punishment must be proportional to the crime for which it is imposed. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) . Embodied in the cruel and unusual punishments ban is the "precept….that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." Id. The Court went on the quote the same language in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) . Proportional analysis in cases involving life without parole in death penalty cases has continued to receive various courts approval. The argument has met with limited success in state courts and almost no success in federal courts. It could therefore be said that "holding that proportionality analysis should not include consideration of the defendant's age "only a balance between the crime and the sentence imposed". In light of having said all this, it is interesting to note that as far back as 1994, one of the members of the Supreme Court questioned not only his moral authority to judge -but that of the Court when he wrote:
"For more than 20 years, I have endeavored -indeed, I have struggledalong with a majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obliged simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually selfevident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic question -does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants "deserve" to die? -cannot be answered in the affirmative". Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
(Blackman, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari).
